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1• Introduction 
The public sector has exerted an influence on 
Indian industry for long c:\ir.e. Over that period it has 
changed in so many way? end its operation has become so 
r, 
entangled with India's political economy at so many levels 
that it is difficult to decide where to begin and how to end 
the convoluted story, - - a story, of course, which continues 
as this paper is being written. An economist can claim that 
many of the relevant a~'-a are not in the public domain, and 
that where they arp. . o intermediate structures of analysis 
exist with v-hich to build up credible design. But an 
economist has also J 3 ac nit that even with the data he 
generally works c:., h. o usual to^ls fail to reveal the under-
lying forces. Layer s^ter- layer of debris and of misleading 
accretions from cas-ja cose. nation of movements of social 
forces havs to be removed befo::e the true foundation can be 
uncovered. Put by the tir ~hc foundation has been exposed, 
the digger begins' to .-''.spec -, the existence of other structures. 
Take, for exc,iolef the question of efficiency 1 how 
does one judge it when every single variable is open to '..J*'' ' ..,".••.'», ' : 
manipulation by arbitrary regulations, illegal diversions, 
abrupt decisions sic7 refusal to take action at critical moments 
How does one look at -ijures of profitability when many of the 
prices entering into the final revenue and profit figures 
reflect anything but opportunity costs ? 
When we enter these caveats, we see at once that 
whatever conclusions we arrive at must be regarded as highly-
tentative. But since most official or semi-official analysts 
seem to be unaware of these very real complications, their 
'authoritative' pronouncements must also be regarded as 
terribly wobbly. This particularly applies to those 
statements which presume an automatic damnability of any 
productive activity in the public domain. 
2. The genesis and growth of the public sector 
In all capitalist and protocapitalist economies, 
the public sector now occupies a prominant position, in 
terms of its contribution to GDP, its draft on national 
resources and its influence on the total expenditure flows 
and their composition. India is no exception. The public 
sector contains many enterprises producing private goods and 
'club' goods as well as what could be called irreducibly 
public goods, that is goods which involve strong external 
( 1 ) 
effects m production or consumption. In India many 
public enterprises produce what theoretically could have 
been produced by private firms as well. Some of these 
enterprises had earlier been privately owned, but had been 
brought under public ownership and control later on. Such 
cases of 'nationalisation' can be found from days of British 
rule (railways are a prominent example). Some were nationa-
lized after independence (the Imperial Bank of India, life 
insurance, general insurance, coal mines are notable examples) 
In seme other cases, the state started enterprises on its own 
the examples, of atomic power, sophisticated machine tools, 
heavy engineering, railway locomotives can be cited here. 
The actual structure of the public sector has evolved as a 
result of many ad hoc decisions taken at different moments 
of time. As a consequence, in a number of sectors both 
public and private enterprises operate, producing very 
similar goods. 
There is no single index which can be used to 
measure the importance of the public sector, or its changes 
over time. Tablesl, 2 and 3 provide some information which 
is relevant for analysis cf the public sector in India. 
Table 1 :Intermediate consumption, gross value-added 
(i.e. without deducting capital consumption) 
and gross output of public sector,1960-61, 
1970-71 and 1979-80 (Rs. million, at current 
prices). 
1960-61 1970-71 1979-80 
Producers of government 
services (Central & 
State) 
a) Intermediate 
consumption 
b) Consumption of 
employees 
G"oss input 
c) Services produced 
for ©wn use 
d) Sale of goods and 
services 
Gross output 
4650.00 
7230.00 
11880.00 
10860.00 
1020.00 
11880.00 
17540.00 
23690.00 
3220.00 
50550.00 
68550.00 
41230.00 118990.00 
38010.00 110410.00 
8580.00 
41230.00 118990.00 
table contd.4/ 

Table 1 contdo 
1960-61 
, Non-departmental finan-
cial enterprises 
a) -Intermediate consumption 180.00 
b) Gross value added" " * 640.00 
bi) Operating surplus 360.00 
Gross output 82 0.00 
1970-71 
780.00 
4180.00 
1780.00 
4960.00 
1979-80 
4450.00 
22170.00 
12540.00 
26620.00 
Source : CSO s Transactions of the Public Sector 1960-61 -
1979-80 Central Statistical Organisation, 
Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, 
Government of India, September 1983, Statements 
1, 5, 25, 31, 34, 40 and 58. 
Notes ; (a) Less subsidy, imputed to enterprises other 
than railways. Gross value added = 
compensation of employees + operating 
surplus. 
* Figures of 1960-61 are not available; figures 
"given are for 1965-66. 
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Table 2 s Percentage share of the public sector in GDP, 
saving, capital formation and final consump-
tion expenditure from 1980-81 to 1985-86 (at 
current prices) „ 
1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 
1. Gross domestic 19.8 20.9 22.8 22.6 23.8 24.9 
product 
2 0„ Gross domestic 16.2 21.5 22.6 16.5 14.7 14.1 
saving 
3. Gross domestic 42.5 42.5 48.6 45.1 48.3 44.8 
capital formation 
4. Final consump- 11.7 11.9 12.7 12.7 13.2 14.4 
tion expendi-
ture 
Source ; CSO s New Series on National Statistics 
with 1980-81 as Base Year, New Delhi, 
Department of Statistics, Ministry of 
Planning, Government of India, February 
1988, Statement 20. 
Table 3 : Employment provided by the public and 
private sectors in organized industry 
(in thousands) 
End of Central 
December govt. 
establi-
shments 
State Total 
govt. public, v 
establi- sector 
shments 
Private sector 
Large(b) Small{ciotal 
1971 '2-, 836 4,217 11,099 6, 018 716 6,734 
1976 3, 074 4,931 13,616 6,063 724 6,787 
1978 3, 128 5, 238 14,501 6, 374 731 7,105 
1980 3, 188 5, 546 15,384 6,656 787 7,443 
1982 3, 250 5,929 16,278 6,725 800 7, 525 
1984 3/ 333 6, 2 84 17,217 6, 530 82 5 7, 355 
1986 3, 341 6, 556 17,913. 6, 565 836 7,401 
Source s Reserve Bank of India ? Report(s) on 
Currency and Finance for the Year(s) 
1983-84 and 1987-88"; Vol(s) . II 
(Bombay, 1984 and 1988). 
Notes • (a) Includes Central government, State 
government, Quasi-government 
(Central and State) enterprises and 
establishments controlled by local 
bodies. 
(b) Establishments employing 2 5 or more 
workers. 
(c) Establishments employing 10 - 24 
workers. 
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Table 1 shows the enormous- growth in the gross 
output of different components of the public sector from 
1960-61 to 1979-80, and also the role of the public sector 
(through^intermediate consumption) as the customer for goods 
and services cf the rest of the economy. Table 2 gives an 
idea of the contribution of the public sector to gross 
domestic saving and investment in the first half of the j.980S. 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x f e The methodology of the construction of 
/revised 
the national income series has been/ recently and so it 
is difficult to compare the more recent figures with the 
figures from earlier ye?rs. However, it has been roughly 
estimated,by 
using earlier national income data, that the 
share of the public sector as a whole, including defence and 
administration, in the net domestic product (NDP) increased 
from 7.5 per cent, in; 1-9FQ-51 to 23.1 per cent in 1983-84, and 
over the same period, the•'contribution of the public sector 
engaged in the production o r goods and services (that is, excluding defence, and administration) to NDP increased from ( 2 ) 3.0 per cent to .17.7 per cent. 
The importance of the productive part of the public 
sector to employment in the organized sector is indicated by 
Table 3. 
From tho^e figures, it is obvious that employment 
creation in the organized sector has proceeded faster in the 
public than in the private scctor. However, the different 
components of the public sector differ tremendously in their 
contribution to employment creation. In particular, there is 
little increase in employment in central government enterprises 
between 1978 and 1986, and in this respect their performance 
is very similar to that of the organized private sector. 
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The figures in Tables 1 - 3 by themselves provide 
only a very partial picture of the importance of the public 
sector at a moment of time and of the changes in that 
importance over time. Apart from the contribution of the 
public sector to gross national expenditure, GDP, gross 
domestic capital formation and gross domestic saving, there 
are several other dimensions that may be considered relevant 
for a reasonably comprehensive analysis. The first is the 
set of forward and backward linkages of the public sector 
with the rest of the economy over, let us say, an annual 
production cycle. A comprehensive input - output transactions 
matrix should be able to capture these linkages. The second 
is a portrayal of changes in these linkages over time. The 
description of such changes ' may pose problems, for 
the nature and strength of the linkages are themselves 
affected by changes in government policies, leading to changes 
in the public - private divide, even when the basic input -
output transactions remain the same. Secondly, changes 
relating to import - export policies can lead to changes in 
the linkage patterns obtaining in the economy. Thirdly, any o 
positive or negative effects on productivity and prices 
resulting from attempts to build up new linkages in the 
economy will lead to further changes in th^ linkages. For 
example, if the attempt to build up an integrated steel 
1 -
industry leads to the growth of ancillary industries which can 
supply inputs at a lower cost, then there will be an inducement 
for more such linkages to be forged; the opposite will be the 
case, if attempts to build linkages lead to proliferation of 
hiqh 
—cost units. Finally, even if government policies regarding 
public - private divide remain the same, the attempt to change 
the composition of products and import technologies rather than 
develop them locally may change the public - private divide 
through the pressure of suppliers of foreign credits and 
technology. It has been found, for example, that while the 
linkages of agro-based industries such as jute textiles, 
cotton textiles, leather and leather products, and food and 
food products are strong enough for them to generate above-
average levels of employment and income, the rest of the 
manufacturing industries have much weaker linkages and 
generate below-average income and employment (compared with 
the resources deployed). Moreover, the latter also tend to 
be much more import-intensive than the agro-based sectors. 
Thus if public investment is concentrated in the relatively 
more modern product-groups, then its linkage effects may 
appear to be lower than for the rest of the manufacturing 
sector. Contrariwise, if sick jute and cotton textile mills 
are taken over by the government, the linkage effect of the 
public sector would appear to go up with no change in the 
underlying input-output relations. 
3. Some forces acting on the public - private divide 
We have in the above only indicated the complications 
in analysis arising out of a consideration of the linkage 
effects of public sector activities and their changes. If 
we turn to the political economy of-government decisions 
regarding the strategic policy variables, including the public-
private divide, then further complexities crop up. 
Take, for example, employment effects of public sector 
investment. It may be argued that despite the formulation of 
the Mahalanobis four sector model, in which employment creation 
was taken care of through labour-intensive cottage industries. 
1 1 
and the services sector, it as income rather than employment 
that was the major target variable of public sector investment. 
The government's major intervention in the field of protection 
of employment took the form of according fiscal privileges to, 
and the reservation of particular product groups for, a broad 
range of village and cottage industries. However, initially, 
the construction of large integrated steel plants and heavy 
engineering complexes generated a considerable amount of 
employment, especially in the resource-rich but backward 
eastern and central regions of the country. In fact, overmanning 
(4) 
plagued many of these plants from the time they began operating, 
because the economy failed to provide many alternative avenues 
of employment at a decent wage and because a politics of 
accommodation naturally emerged under such conditions. 
Employment as a target variable for public sector 
investment has, since then, been further downgraded by a two-
fold change in policy. First, the policy of protection of 
employment in the cottage industrial sector has been greatly 
diluted from the beginning of the 1980s. This has meant a 
relative,if not absolute/diversion of many of the fiscal 
subsidies provided by the central government. (However, the 
state government activities may have partly compensated for 
the scaling down of central government support). Secondly, 
( 5 ) 
as I have argued earlier, increasingly (from the middle of 
the 1970s), public enterprises were told to behave like 
private firms. This meant among other things, accepting more 
or less in toto, the highly capital-intensive designs provided 
by the consultants and technology suppliers from OECD countries. 
1 2 
This relative shift in the central government's 
critical target variables within the productive public sector 
is linked to the more general shift in the political economy 
of Indian developments and policy choices. We can no more 
than touch on some of these shifts in this paper, concentrating 
only on those that have directly affected the public-private 
divide.^^ To start with,the private sector, and in particular 
many of the old monopoly houses/ha-^e grown enormously. New 
groups with command over financial resources and ability to 
manipulate the state apparatus for their ends have come to 
the fore. The growth of such groups has in turn been facili-
tated by a number of factors. First, the growth of public 
sector provided expanded markets for the private sector. 
Secondly, the provision of basic goods such as pig iron, 
finished steel, coal, etc. and of .infrastructural facilities 
such as railway transport., electricity, roads, and water at 
subsidised rates increased -che legitimate profits of the 
private sector. Thirdly, the provision of cheap term loans 
through banks and other financial bodies and foreign exchange 
at a price which did not reflect its real degree of scarcity 
also added to the profits of the private sector. Fourthly, 
the government has increasingly treated the private sector 
with tenderness and lightened its fiscal burden through 
various devices. Finally, private businessmen and industria-
lists have used a whole set of devices such as tax evasion, 
reneging on their statutory commitments to workers, black 
marketing of goods in short supply and i.1 legal speculation 
in real estate to .amass illicit profits. 
The relative growth in the power of the large-scale 
private sector has also been facilitated by defaults of the 
public sector - defaults which can again be traced in many 
1 3 
cases to the engrossing activities of private businessmen. 
The defaults did not occur all at the same time, or in all 
the areas of production or technology development and transfer. 
This temporal and areawise differentiation within the public 
sector makes it all the more necessary to carry out a mesolevel 
analysis - an analysis that acts as a bridging device between 
the micro-study of particular public enterprises and the 
macroeconomic and macropolitical analysis of the public sector 
as a whole. 
Take, for example, the case of the iron and steel 
industry. The justification for building it up could be 
couched in terms of the availability within India of some of 
the basic resources such as coal, gnod-quality iron ore and 
cheap labour. Further justification could be sought in the 
necessity of giving priority to capital and intermediate goods 
industries (those belonging to Department I in Marx's schemes 
of expanded reproduction) t^ invoking the logic of the Feldman-
Mahalanobis two-sector model of growth. Yet other arguments 
would centre on the claim that in the long run it was cheaper 
to develop integrated steel arr' associated engineering industries 
than to depend on imports, especially when traditional exports 
might be relatively stagnant. The plea could be expanded to 
argue that India could instal more and bigger steel plants and 
export steel. 
The correctness of such arguments cannot, however, be 
established by studying government decisions as a once-for-all 
act, or by taking just two snapshots of the economy s one, the 
economy without public sector industry and two, the economy 
augmented by the public sector steel plants and associated 
engineering industries. What was happening in between the two 
1 4 
snapshots would be essential in finding out whether ultimately 
it was better for the economy to have those plants, whether 
the benefits derived could have been jonsiderably larger if 
the plants had been implicated in a different history, and 
whether, if there were major shortfalls between the feasibly 
optimum patterns of growth and the actual pattern, the fault 
lay in developments within the steel sector or in developments 
in the sectors immediately linked to it or in developments 
in the economy and polity as a whole (with attendant reper-
cussions on the steel and associated sectors as well). What 
I am trying to say can be put in another way s the history 
of the public sector steel plants and their success or failure 
are intimately tied up with guestions of (a) the choice of 
projects and their appropriateness in terms of economies of 
scale, input composition etc., (b) the trajectory of execution 
of the projects, including delays and unscheduled alterations 
/and 
in equipment or technology, if any/ the establishment of 
ancillary plants for supplying inputs domestically/c) the 
manner and content of transfer of technology from abroad (and 
in rare cases from within the country), (d) formalization of 
regular procedures of maintenance and overhauling of plants, 
(e) implantation of formal methods of learning and improvement 
of productivity through better operating procedures and 
marginal changes in design or layout, (f) institutionalization 
of technological development through R & D in the plants or in 
laboratories to which plant personnel have ready access and 
from which scientists and technologists can have ready access 
to the plants, and (g) regularization of cost-effective 
investment decisions for modernization and expansion of the 
plants (since many of them involve process technologies, 
economies of scale tend to become stronger over time). 
Some technologists who were associated with the public 
sector steel industry almost from its Inception have argued 
that many of the decisions with regard to the two plants at 
Rourkela and Bhilai /ere on the right lines. The German firms 
associated with Rourkela had a long experience in steel 
production on a competitive basis, and they were eager to 
re-establish their credentials ?nd establish German engineering 
technology as a front-runner in the postwar period of recons-
truction and growth. For political reasons, in order to show 
her goodwill to non-aligned In^.ia, the Soviet Union wanted to 
establish a plant which would be a showpiece of socialist aid 
^or development in a non-aligned country. The British effort 
at Durgapur was, however, much more of a patched-up affair, 
lacking either the political drive of the Soviet project or 
the competitive edge of the German steel and engineering giants. 
In the case of the Rourkela and Bhilai plants, there 
was an attempt from the very beginning to develop a technical 
cadre which could not only read the drawings handed down by the 
consultancy organizations and the foreign contractors of the 
plants, but also could themselves learn how to design at least 
parts of the plants. This technical cadre, whose beginnings 
can be traced to 1954formsd the core of what became first the 
Central Engineering and Design Bureau (CEDB) of Hindustan Steel 
and later on, a separate central government undertaking, the 
Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants ME CON) . The Soviet 
Union also helped set up two heavy engineering complexes, the 
Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation at Durgapur and the 
Heaving Engineering Corporation at Ranchi. The latter was 
equipped to provide all the heavy machinery that would be 
required to set up an integrated steel plant of the vintage 
that was prevalent in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. However, 
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the implementation of these twin objectives of fully absorbing 
(and when necessary, upgrading) the technology transferred by 
the foreign suppliers and of establishing engineering complexes 
that would supply the machinery needed for large integrated 
steel plants became increasingly difficult. Briefly, the 
difficultier originated in (a) the shortage of foreign exchange 
which forced the government to seek foreign help even in the 
areas where technical expertise and domestic capita] goods 
were available, and (b) the failure to mobilize domestic 
resources and keep up the tempo of growth envisaged in the 
second and,third five year plan periods. Thece lapses 
rendered much of the capacity of the MAMC and HEC idle. 
These failures in turn hamstrung the efforts of the CEDB and 
other Indian consultancy organizations to acquire practical 
experience in designing and constructing plants. without such 
experience, these organizations could neither accumulate the 
'learning capital' nor the goodwill which would allow them to 
compete ®n more equal terms with foreign contractors and 
consultants based in Europe, Japan or Nort-h America. 
Even though such difficulties surfaced already in the 
1960s and persisted throughout the 1970s, it can be argued 
that the idea of acquiring the expertise for constructing and 
designing large industrial plants in steel or fertilizers was 
not given up, although the tilt of the government policy 
towards turnkey projects supplied by foreign consultants could 
be detected even from the end of the 1960s. This tilt has been 
more marked in recent times s the government has often accepted 
a situation where practically all inputs,barring the unavoidable 
civil engineering works in situ, are supplied, by foreign 
contractors, while the capacity of domestic capital goods 
industries and domestic technical cadres remain grossly under-
utilised and the latter are forced to undergo a de-learning 
process. 
-s 17. s-
We have fy/eJt on these problems at a greater 
than is usually dono/ — — ~ — 1 . ^ — . ox. .learning and /through 
productivity, growth/sustained utilisation of domestic capaci-
tieis are often ignored in the literature. Moreover, in the 
context of larger debates about the political economy of India 
where intellactuals are sometimes put forward as a component 
of the ruling class, it is often forgotten that there are 
enormous differences ..among intellectuals in respect of power, 
orientation and even narrow self-interest. While a few 
intellectuals rray accumulate power by remaining close to the 
top ppliticians and businessmen and acting as their minions^ 
there is a much greater number even within the public sector 
establishments who are more the victims of the system and its 
failures than beneficiaries of its mode of functioning. 
The failure to realize much of the potential of the 
public sector in terms of building viable linkages and facili-
tating absorption and diffusion of technology in turn gave..a 
relative advantage to the advocates of a greater role for the 
private sector. Other forces besides the ones we have already 
referred to earlier favoured a policy shift towards the private 
sector. These included the draining of the surplus of the 
public sector through legal and illegal subsidization of private 
interests (at the cost of the former), and the strengthened hold 
of transnational corporations (TNCs)as suppliers of technology, 
private business groups with financial and political clout were 
often able to utilize the power of the TNCs to bargain for 
their own investment projects at the cost of the public sector. 
It should, however, be remembered that che tendency towards 
increasing centralization of state power in India also gave an 
additional advantage to large, ambitious business groups. They 
could concentrate their pressure on a few strategic points 
1 8 % -
/their own 
and seek to reorient policies to suit/convenience. The 
trend towards economic liberalization also strengthened the 
large private interest groups^irTco?2abcration with TNCs . 
The same liberalization and the increasing dependence on 
foreign loans favoured the implementation of more and more 
foreign-financed and foreign-constructed turnkey projects in 
public enterprises, especially those under the control of 
the central government. Many large public enterprises have 
begun to resemble large private firms in their utter dependence 
on foreign technology, without, however, acquiring an autonomy 
in management or long-term investment decisions. 
4. Large-scale industry and the problems of investment failures 
problems with the utilization of public sector steel capacity 
rs -
When the Government of India decided to step up the 
pace of industrialization and set up large-scale units in the 
public sector, its action could be interpreted as a gap-filling 
exercise or as an antidote to investment failure. In the 
government's perception, the private sector had neither the 
resources nor the incentive to develop what have been called (7) 
'capital-dominated' industries, that is, industries 
characterized by strong economies of scale and requiring large 
volumes of capital for a viable scale of operation. It turned 
out that public investment or expenditure was also required 
in the long run for solving a macroeconomic investment failure 
problem. This sounds paradoxical for an economy that is 
continually plagued by deficits in balance of payments. But 
the paradox vanishes if we realize that what we are talking 
about is an ex ante saving-investment gap. what is observed 
ex post is a positive import-export gap (by accounting defini-
tion also equal to the ex post investment-saving gap) that 
19 i — 
results from a downward adjustment of the rate of saving and 
an upward adjustment of imports to strike a balance with a 
( 8 ) partly foreign-financed rate of investment. 
While it would require a long exegesis to provide 
full empirical validation of the proposition of investment 
failure, some rough-and-ready indicators may be provided here. 
Throughout the period from 1950-51, and especially 
from the Second Plan period, the public sector has accounted 
for a much larger fraction of gross investment than of gross 
or net domestic saving. This has normally been seen as a 
symptom of the failure of the public sector to generate enough 
internal resources for financing its own investment. Many 
economists have pointed to deliberate underpricing of public 
sector goods and services, various open and concealed subsidies 
provided by the public to the private sector, in addition to 
inefficiency and under-utilisation of capacity in the public 
sector as reasons for the persistent excess/public sector 
(9) 
investment over its saving. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
The true surplus of the public sector would have been conside-
rably higher, if the implicit and explicit subsidies to the 
private sector were added to the nominal income of the public 
sector. But even after taking such transfers into account, 
there would probably remain a large and positive gaps between 
the gross domestic capital formation of the public sector and 
its saving. 
A similar gap characterizes the gross capital formation 
of the organized private sector and the internal savings 
generated by it and more generally, the generation and the 
use of funds by „the private corporate sector, xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxx A situation where the household sector accounts 
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for most of the saving in the economy whereas the organized 
sector, whether the ownership is private or public, invests 
most of the surplus, characterizes the process of commerciali-
zation and financial deepening in a market-oriented economy. 
In India, however, much of the capital formation in the 
private corporate sector is financed by loans and equity 
capital provided by the public to the private sector.^10^The 
proportion financed by equity capital and debentures from 
sources other than public financial institutions has gone up 
dramatically in recent years. This is also connected with the 
change in the political economy of India shifting the line of 
public-private divide that we have already touched on. Moreover, 
e private corporate sector also is a net user of Eunds provided 
/che households. To take a crude indicator, in 1981-82 and 
1982-83, the household sector was the source of Rs. 16075 
million and Rs. 16370 million respectively of funds used by 
the private corporate sector while it received only Rs.1081 
million and Rs.1244 million in 1981-82 and 1982-83 respectively 
(11) 
from the private corporate sector. Thus we have to 
recognise a continual process of transfer of resources from 
the household sector to the private corporate sector and to 
the government. Some of the government policies in recent 
years can be seen as being aimed at increasing the net revenue 
available to the private corporata sector, and disposable 
income in the hands of households who come within the purview 
of direct taxes, and facilitating the investment of such 
surpluses by the private sector. Naturally if these changes 
come about, even if partially,the household sector surplus 
available for public sector investment will shrink. Some of 
the policy changes discussed above would affect both the total 
volume of public sector investment and its allocation. 
The attempt to fill the gaps in industrial investment 
by using the instrument of public enterprises was made, from 
the very beginning, on some wrong premises. It was assumed 
that foreign assistance could be sought and obtained to finance 
the purchase of plant and equipment and to set up the new 
units of production without affecting the quality of absorption 
of technology by the new enterprises or without affecting their 
/go§<8sational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s • V e r Y soon the import.bill of - capital 
/ for the capital-dominated units, in addition to the other 
demands for foreign exchange generated by the government and 
private expenditure programmes, outran the supplies of foreign /then 
exchange. Indiscriminate use was/made of foreign aid. The aid 
was normally tied to purchases of eguipment and materials from 
the countries giving loans and grants. Only halting and 
ineffective attempts were made to insulate the choices of 
technology and product-mix against pressures exerted by foreign 
firms and their agents. As a result, foreign suppliers often 
got away with misspecifying the capacity of the plants set up 
and their operating characteristics. In some cases, for example, 
that of the Durgapur Steel Plant, Indian managers of the 
plants could not master fully even the operating technology 
of those plants, let alone learn how to replace them or expand 
them so as to take full advantage of economies of scale or (12) advances in technology occurring in the fields concerned. 
The failure to effectively monitor the activities of 
foreign contractors involved in setting up the new plants 
often showed up as a difference between design capacity and 
effective capacity. While many public sector units suffered 
from underutilization of capacity as a result of macroeconomic 
policy failures, the degree of underuse was also exaggerated 
because of a failure to distinguish effective from design 
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capacity. Capital costs were calculated on design rather 
than effective capacity and their burden was all that much 
greater because of the shortfall of effective from design 
capacity. The losses suffered by the public sector from this 
source were compounded by the pricing policy governing the 
outputs of public sector units. Thus, prices of most varieties 
of steel were deliberately kept below the effective costs of 
production. Such underpricing was supposed to be a means of 
encouraging private investment. For the same reason, the 
product mixes imposed on the public sector plants were also 
different from what they would have chosen if they had to 
maximize the revenue, if only the prices but not the quantities 
of different products were regulated. Thus in terms of current 
revenue generation also public sector units had to bear a 
double burden - control of prices as well as quantities and 
product-mixes produced by them. 
The losses imposed on the public sector by these types 
of policies are illustrated by a series of calculations made 
by Ramprasad Sengupta and his team regarding the effective 
capacities and the optimal revenue levels pertaining to the 
three integrated steel plants located at Bhilai, Rourkelaand 
Durgapur and owned by the central government company, Hindustan 
Steel Limited (Tables 4 and 5). 
- J F* r- * . ' 
In Table 4, the three variants of optimum capacity refer 
to the capacities worked out by taking the internal and external 
constraints into account, and rendering them increasingly 
binding in the optimizing exercises. In the case of both 
Rourkela and Durgapur steel plants, the optimizing exercises 
even with the loosest of constraints throw up effective 
capacities which were much smaller than the rated capacities, 
Table 4; Rated capacity, optimal effective capacity 
and actual production of steel ingots in 
three Indian steel plants in 197 3-74 
figures in million tons). 
Rated capacity 
Optimal capacity 
Variant 1 
Variant 2 
Variant 3 
Bhilai 
Steel Plant 
2 .50 
2.24 
2.15 
1.81 
u 
Actual ingot production 1.89 
Rourkela 
Steel Plant 
1 .80 
1.11 
0.99 
0.96 j 
1 .08 
Durgapur 
Steel Plant 
1.60 
0.96 
0 . 8 6 
0.68 
0.78 
Source R. Sengupta and others : problems *f 
Production and Investment Planning in 
Indian Steel Industry - Hindustan 
Steel Limited - a Case Study, Vol.1, 
Centre for Economic Studies, Presidency 
College, Calcutta, 1978, pp.296-297. 
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Table 5. Optimum revenues and net profit with or 
without social priority stipulation (SPS) 
of three Indian steel plants, 1976-77 
(figures in Rs.'OOO). 
Bhilai 
Steel Plant 
At JPC,A At stock ( a ) .a prices < yard 
( prices 
1,297,120 
1. Optimum 658,743 996,538 
revenue 
in the 
presence 
SPS(b) 
2. Optimum 1,154,640 
revenue 
in the 
absence 
of SPS 
3. Optimum -207,064) 130,731 
net 
profit 
with 
SPS (c) 
4. Optimum 34,040 413,063 
net 
profit 
without 
SPS 
Rourkela 
Steel Plant 
At JPC 
prices 
At stock 
yard 
prices 
1,201,190 
1,474,390 
138,551 
1,656,570 
1,767,960 
593,931 
Durgapur 
Steel Plant 
At JPC 
prices 
529,083 
595,357 
-148,982 
At stock 
yard 
prices 
774,560 
916,477 
96,496 
Source ; R. Sengupta ; Problems of Production and Investment 
Planning in Indian Iron and Steel Industry -
Hindustan Steel Limited - a Case Study, Vol.3, 
Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, 
jawaharlal Nehru University, 1978, Tables 5.1.1A -
5.1 j, 1C. 
Notes:(a)JPC = Joint Plant Committee 
(b)Optimum revenue = value of optimum gross output 
minus variable costs. 
(c)Optimum net revenue = optimum revenue minus fixed cost. 
(d)For Rourkela Steel Plant, no feasible solution was 
found if the social priority stipulation was obeyed 
but steel slabs could not be procured in desired 
quantity from outside the plant. 
and it can be seen that the degree of capacity utilization is 
far higher than is indicated if the actual output is compared 
with the nominal capacities. It is not accidental that while 
the Rourkela and Durgapur steel plants were built by a German 
and a British consortium respectively, with tying of the 
construction to sales of equipment by principals and their 
affiliates, the far more effective and larger Bhilai steel 
© 
plant was built by the Russians at a time when they were 
eager to demonstrate their friendliness and technological 
prowess. (For various external and internal reasons, the 
experience with the Bokaro and the Visakhapatnam steel plants, 
built with Russian aid - the latter is still under construction 
has not been as happy as with the Bhilai plant). 
In Table 5 (in which social priority atipulation refers 
to compulsory production of specified quantities of particular 
types of product under government direction) are given the 
figures of gross revenue earnings and net profits by the 
three steel plants under alternative price and quantity 
regulation regimes. The prices set by the Joint Plant 
Committee which allocated minimum quantities of outputs to 
be produced and sold ex-factory at controlled prices to the 
different steel plants were considerably lower than 
those the steel plants., realised, from sales at regulated 
stockyards. It is seen that even sales at the regulated prices 
of the stockyards would have made a large difference to the 
revenue and net profits of the steel plants, but, of course, 
public sector steel plants were not free to sell most of their 
output in the stockyards. Moreover, it is seen that with the 
socalled social priority specification (SPS) even the best 
plant, viz., Bhilai, would have realised a negative profit with 
the optimum product-mix, and so would the Durgapur plant. 
2 6 
Rourkela is shown as making a positive profit with SPS, but 
only on the assumption that it had an external source of 
supply of slabs at unchanging prices - otherwise its product-
mix with SPS turns out to have been altogether infeasible. If 
we contrast the experience of the public sector units with that 
of say/ the Tata Iron and Steel Co. (TISCO)/ several advantages 
of the latter come out clearly. First, TISCO chose those 
products which promised the largest net revenue per unit of 
cost incurred, while the public sector units were not permitted 
to do so. The TISCO could also make other products such as 
chrome ore outside the purview of price control and boost its 
(13) 
profits further. It has also been suggested that the Tata 
enterprise could make marginal investments in the name of 
maintenance and thus keep up, and even augment, its effective 
capacity. Such managerial autonomy is as not yet a characte-
ristic of most public enterprises. Finally, it has been 
suggested that TISCO could obtain more power from the public 
, . . /utilities 
electricity/and better railway service and even a more profi-
table product-mix by using various methods which were not open -to the pufjlic sector units. 
5. The macroeconomic crisis of the 1960s and effects on public 
sector planning. 
Detailed conjectural exercises comparable to 
those for the steel sector are not available for all maior /But J 
public sector enterprises ./by now a considerable amount of 
analysis has been carried out cn the excess costs and dynamic 
inefficiency imposed cn most of the public sector projects 
because of the failure of the government to break out of 
dependence on foreign sources of funds tied to sales of parti-
cular types of technology for setting up the installations. 
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/(HMT) 
For example, the Hindustan Machine Tools/is known as one of 
the most successful public enterprises Government support was 
needed to create an indigenous machine tool industry since 
most private machine tool enterprises collapsed after the 
second World War. The initial collaboration agreement of the 
HMT with Oerlikons of Switzerland, restricted the development 
of machine tools by the former to only a few varieties and 
impeded the transfer of technology.^14^ Similar problems, but 
of a less serious import, arose with a later collaboration 
agreement of HMT with Marwin Machine Tools (of the U.K.) for (IS) the development of CMC Machine Centres. ' 
HMT illustrates both the troubles public sector units 
have faced because of dependence on foreign technologies and 
because of an initial specialization in the production of 
capital goods, and the strategies the more successful units 
have followed to overcome the difficulties. Since initially 
i * 
the HMT specialised exclusively in the production of machine 
tools, the recession in Indian industry, starting in 1965-66, 
seriously affected its output and profit. However, the firm 
then diversified into the production of watches, which was a /T:he 
consumer good and into tractors.7i3.tter became a major capital 
good for agricultural production in the states of India which 
underwent the processes of the Green Revolution, and in which 
the average size of operational holdings was large. HMT was 
more successful in the production of watches than of tractors, 
but made enough profits from its watch division to avoid going 
sick, a fate that has overtaken a number of firms in the 
engineering industry both in the private and the public sectors. 
The causes of the recession in Indian industry in the 
middle of the 1960s have been debated intensively in the 
(16) literature. The following factors have been stressed in 
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various degrees as causing the recession % (a) a stagnation 
in the demand for the most important mass consumer good produced 
by industry, viz, cotton textiles; (b) a stagnation or fall 
in demand for some of the most elementary producer goods used 
by the poorer strata of producers, leading to a sales crisis 
in certain sectors of engineering industry; (c) a fall in 
public investment, especially investment in railways, causing 
a sales crisis in the basic and capital goods sold by both 
private and public firms; (d) a fall in agricultural output, 
first aggravating factors considered under (a) and (b) but 
eventually also accentuating a decline in public expenditures 
and helping to turn a temporary recession into a long-term 
stagnation; and (e) an adverse movement in the terms of trade 
of industry as against agriculture causing a further erosion 
of the purchasing power of those people in whose budgets 
expenditure on food looms large, and aggravating the fall in 
the profits of private industrialists through narrowing of 
(17) the margins between prices and (enhanced) wage costs. 
I do not want to debate the relative importance of 
these factors in causing the recession or the long-term stag-
nation, which many economists have claimed, ended only in 
the 1980s. What is important to note is that several 
different chains of causation are postulated in these accounts, 
and several types of limits are imposed implicitly or explicitly 
on the autonomy of state action. The question of the degree 
of freedom enjoyed by the state in India is of vital importance 
in understanding the pattern of growth of the public sector 
and indeed of the whole Indian economy and society. If we 
simply confine our attention to the recession of 1965-67 and 
the years of stagnation of industrial growth, one question 
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naturally arises : what prevented the public sector from 
spending more on its capital programmes and thus generating 
demand for at least the public sector enterprises ? Several 
answers could be provided for this. The first is that, as 
has been argued by Prabhat Patnaik and others there was 
a serious danger of inflation exceeding politically safe 
limits if public expenditure was pushed too high in the face 
of a rather inelastic supply of wage goods. 
As the Green Revolution and creeping inflation helped 
loosen the wage goods constraint in two ways, viz. by imparting 
a greater degree of stability to the supply of foodgrains and 
by helping concentrate assets and incomes in the hands of the 
more affluent sections of the peasantry, the 'inflationary 
barrier' (to borrow Joan Robinson's phrase) receded. However, 
this took quite a few years to accomplish. Moreover, the more 
narrowly economic conflicts have increasingly tended to take 
the form of overt social, ethnic and communal clashes in 
many regions of India § inflationary instability is not the 
only kind of instability social scientists have to worry 
about while programming the unleashing of an unbridled state 
apparatus in India. The experience of the Emergency period 
showed that a state which suppressed social conflicts forcibly 
and was able to keep inflationary pressures at bay because 
of good harvests could step up public investment and produc-
tion by capital goods industries. But the accumulation of 
stocks of unsaleable steel over the Emergency period also 
showed that unless appropriate action was taken to change the 
product mix of the capital goods industries and stimulate the 
demand for them from other sectors of the economy, such accele-
ration of industrial growth would be temporary, and hence a 
purely etatist strategy of industrial growth would not work 
in India. 
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However, it is very probable that a perception of the 
receding of the inflationary barrier encouraged the policy-
makers to step up expenditures in recent years, and give a 
boost to certain kinds of manufacture. 
5. The balance of payments and fiscal constraints on policy-
making, and their consequences. 
A purely domestic and macroeconomic limit is not the 
only constraint that may come into operation in India. The 
other two constraints are an external balance of payments 
constraint and a domestic, class-determined fiscal constraint. 
I have in the past tried to find hierarchies of these constra-
(19) 
ints at different junctures of industrial growth. For 
building up a general model Of industrial growth and stagnation, 
we have to go on searching for constraints which become binding 
at different points as the structure of industry, the inter-
national linkages and nacroeconomic balances change. We need 
to look more specifically into institutional and class-related 
factors at critical points in order to measure the relative 
stringency of the binding constraints, and the strategies used 
by the decision-makers to loosen those constraints or render 
them in-effective by discovering new exit routes. r i . 
To go back, for example, to the years of industrial 
and economic recession in the second half of the sixties, the 
reason why the fall in agricultural output and the marketed 
surplus unnerved the decision-makers so much is that they had 
become far too dependent on food aid, and that their demand 
for foreign inputs for investment in critical growth-
augumenting areas (such as production of fertilizers) had 
become quite inelastic and inflexible. At the same time, 
the rulers despaired of being able either to contain the 
demand for food within the limits of domestic availability 
or to mobilise a large marketable surplus by procuring grain 
from the countryside at controlled prices. 
If we turn to more recent developments, we see that 
the government of India has resorted to very large doses of 
deficit financing in order to find the wherewithal for 
financing its burgeoning levels of un-productive expenditure. 
Most of India's leading economists have lamented this 
phenomenon . ^ 20^ Prabhat Patnaik and several other economists 
have talked of a 'fiscal crisis'. In the Indian context, the 
crisis is equivalent to the government not being able to meet 
its expenditures through market borrowing and tax and non-tax 
revenue and having to resort to the printing of notes and to 
arbitrary increase in administered prices, which in turn 
seriously erode the real value of the government's resources. 
On the other hand, politically, the government is not in a 
crisis as far as the financiers of the party apparatus are 
concerned. From the days of Liaquat Ali Khan's budget, 
through the covering up of the findings of the Income Tax 
Investigation Committee, and the abortion of the tax reform 
proposals of Nicholas Kaldor, the Indian upper classes have 
shown a strong disinclination against direct taxation in any 
form. The net disposable incomes of the upper classes have 
increased through legal and illegal channels, and the governments 
'fiscal crisis' internally is largely a mirror image of the 
propensity of the Indian businessmen, landlords, top bureau-
crats and politicians to pass on the burden of government 
administration and government subsidies to the shoulders of 
the majority of the people whose incomes are below the 
minimum exemption limit for income tax purposes. 
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The ironical fact is that since major commercial banks 
and term-lending institutions are nationalised and are seen as 
a source of cheap, and in sticky situations, non-repayable, 
loans, the private sector is quite happy with keeping them in 
(21) 
public hands. In a recent paper, Mihir Rakshit has shown 
that the actual net liability of the public to the private 
sector is quite low when we take account of the assets of the 
public enterprises and the liability of the private sector to th< 
nationalized banks and other financial institutions.Thus the 
'debt trap' of the government could be regarded as primarily 
a matter of internal household management of the upper classes 
but for three facts. -The first is that there is an accelerated 
tendency to gouge out. the public sector, including the 
budgetary resources of the government, for the benefit of 
private sector profits, and thus increase the burden of 
exploitation of the common people. The second is a tendency 
to use the public sector as a base for the consumption of 
superior types of goods by the upper classes(Maruti Udyog is 
a prime, but not the only, example of this tendency). The 
third is an increasing resort to external resources as a 
budgetary supplement end as a maans of evading the other 
constraints. 
This brings us back to the problem of limits imposed 
on the freedom of action of the. state ana more narrowly, of 
the public sector, by dependence on external resources. This 
dependence, let it be noted, has been as much policy-induced, 
as 'structural'. if We take a view of the whole development 
experience of India over the period from 1347, we find several 
occasions when the choices were muffed, and easy ways out were 
taken. In 1947, the Indian capitalist class or the Indian 
government showed no determination to exclude foreign capital 
from control of major sectors of the economy. In fact, in 
1949, the then Prime Minister of India went out of his way 
to make a special policy statement telling existing foreign 
businesses not to worry. This policy sprang not from a 
shortage of foreign exchange - India had large sterling 
balances, and during the Korean war, there was a boom in 
Indian exports - nor from consideration for high technology. 
Most Anglo-Indian businesses in India were in relatively 
low-technology industries. The existing foreign business and 
their local collaborators-truly acted as Trojan horses, rigging 
local markets, importing obsolete technologies and obstructing 
the development of local technology. 
The blinkered nature of Indian policy even in its 
'nationalist' phase was shown up in the way the government 
planned to develop India's steel industry. Almost at the 
same time that the Japanese were sending out their own teams 
to Austria to buy up and absorb the knowhow of the L - D 
process on their own, the Indian government was looking for 
firms which would make new steel plants for India on a 
turnkey basis and allowing - nay, encouraging - the two private 
sector steel firms to seek foreign aid with packages of foreign 
consultancy in all aspects of plant construction and design 
for expanding and modernizing their plants. The story of the 
Central Engineering and Design Bureau of Hindustan Steel (later, 
Mechanical and Engineering Consultants) which we have summarized 
earlier is one of a very grudging encouragement by the state s 
whenever some foreign suppliers promised credit for plant 
construction, they were allowed their way as regards design 
a. ( 2 2 ) and construction in most respects. 
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In the fertilizer industry, as in the case of the iron 
and steel industry, attempts had been made almost from the 
time the first public sector unit was set up to both absorb 
the foreign technology for production of ammonia and urea and 
to oroduce new catalysts for ammonia synthesis and other (23) 
processes inolved in fetiliser production. The P & D 
division of the Fertilizer Corporation of India also tried 
to build up design and construction expertise in collaboration 
with a few foreign consultants and contractors not only for 
petroleum and natural-gas based plants, but also for coal-based 
plants. A study of capacity utilization in three plants, two 
constructed by the P & D Division of the Fertilizer Corporation 
of India as the prime contractor (now Projects and Development 
India Ltd.) and one constructed by a transnational corporation 
(TNC) as the prime contractor found no dominating superiority (24) 
of the plant designed, and commissioned by the TNC. However, 
a decisive difference did occur in the costs of construction 
of some plants for which the P & D division had been the prime 
contractor. These costs were generally higher than those for 
comparable plants for which the TNCs had been the prime 
contractors. The reasons were all external, and they were 
connected with the fact that-while the TNCs came equipped with 
ready foreign credits (including loans from the World Bank) 
and could choose their equipment and sub-contractors freely, 
the P & D Division could not choose their equipment suppliers 
freely and had to depend on tardy and uncertain releases of 
foreign exchange by the Indian government. Embroiled in an 
endemic foreign exchange crisis, and unable to stick to a 
long-term plan for technological development through the agency 
o^ indigenous consultancy and R & D set-ups, the Indian 
government allowed the TNCs to pick their subcontractors and 
obtain the lion's share of the foreign exchange ear-marked 
for public sector industry. Much of the latter was in any 
case negotiated on the premise of the involvement of the TNCs. 
Hence the indigenous consultancy firms had to bear the brunt 
of intermittent and uncertain supply of equipment and foreign 
exchange : it was found that in most cases, the cost escalation 
of projects for which the P & D Division (or its successors) 
was supposed to be the prime contractors (but effectivity 
were not) was due to external factori2^and these in turn 
aggravated the internal problems of control and further 
development of the consultancy organization. 
Not only in the steel industry and the fertilizer and 
machine tool industries, but also in the pharmaceuticals 
industry, and in many other less prominent areas, the 
development of both the capital goods industry and the 
processes of effective absorption, adaptation and upgradation 
of technology have been impeded by the continued and ever-
renewed dependence of the Indian government on foreign loans 
4. (26) and grants. 
Although the efficacy and the dynamic sustainability 
of both the public and private sector projects are hampered 
by foreign exchange shortages and tying of the projects to 
particular foreign countries or companies, there is some 
evidence that the long-run financial costs of foreign colla-
boration agreements for import of knowhow tend to be lower 
(27) 
for public than for privately controlled enterprises. At 
the same time, the R & D effort mounted by public enterprises 
has been far more impressive in terms of absolute expenditure 
per firm, proportion of those expenditures to sales and growth 
since 1976-77.(28) 
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H^wever, as we have already argued, the effectiveness 
of public enterprises as agents of growth in output and 
productivity is obstructed continually by the resource-
constrained regime that the government imposes on all long-
term investments, by private interests distorting the nature 
of the projects, by the additional costs imposed on public 
enterprises because of both legal and corrupt extortion of 
their funds by private interests, and finally, because of 
the social setting in which they have to operate. Managerial 
failures also contribute to the debility of public enterprises, 
but they are in turn largely caused by unresolved tensions 
between managerial autonomy, public accountability and politics1 
manipulation. 
In the above account, we have not referred to industrial 
licensing and import controls as independent determinants of 
either the rate of growth or the public-private balance. 
Critics of industrial licensing, import controls etc. often 
write as if the Indian government operates in a world payments 
system where it could draw on an unlimited supply of capital 
and other resources at a going price. Since that situation 
does not obtain, means have had to be found for rationing 
investible resources % current prices of such resources cannot 
be relied on to do the job in a world in which most futures 
markets do not exist,and the law of one price does not obtain 
(29) 
for most goods. We can discuss the relative efficiency 
various methods of rationing by devices other than prices alone, 
but the need for such rationing has to be taken for granted. 
If private investment in India has been rationed through 
devices of industrial licensing, control over capital issues 
ard the regulation of imports of oapi-tal goods, public sector 
inv^unent has had to cross the hurdles of scrutiny by a number 
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of ministries and by bodies such as the Expenditure Finance 
Committee, the Foreign Investment Board and the Public 
Investment Board/ 3 0^ The dependence of the public enter-
prises on release of funds by the central government on a 
rather arbitrary basis, the tying of many of their proposals 
to external sources of aid (which the recent Sengupta Committee 
took simply as an unalterable fact of life), the sabotaging 
of any fixation of responsibility because of lack of identi-
fication of a prime contractor who takes charge of all major 
decisions relating to investment, and the subversion of many 
public sector projects because of leakage of resources to the 
private sector - these factors have acted repeatedly to prolong 
the gestation and fruition periods of public sector projects 
(31) 
and enormously increased their costs. ' when we take into 
account the fact that in most public enterprises the ratio of 
equity to loan capital is rather low, and that many of them 
operate in sectors in which there are large fluctations in 
demand leading to unpredictable revenue losses, it is not 
surprising that many public enterprises run at a loss. These 
losses impede their investment plans and often hold up 
needed modernization programmes, since, generally speaking, 
a loss-making enterprise is considered guilty unitl it is 
proved innocent. And with the new stress on financial 
accountability of the public sector, the concerned authorities 
very often take a long time to scrutinize programmes for 
technical upgradation. Such delays in turn aggravate the 
problems of the concerned public enterprises (as, for example, 
has happened in the case of the programme for modernization 
of the Durgapur and Burnpur steel plants). 
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6. Profitability and social responsibility ; inadequacy of 
managerial solutions 
We have already pointed out that comparing the 
profitability of public and private sectors poses many 
difficulties, because the prices of many of the public sector 
goods and services are deliberately kept low as a policy 
measure. Despite this, some attempts have been made to 
compare the profitability of those public enterprises which 
are not simply the new legal cover for bankrupt private firms 
(the taken-over sick units). One such recent study by Sankar, 
(1.2) 
Tilak and Saiv enquired into the profitability of the 541 
public and private limited companies whose balance sheets are 
analysed by the Reserve Bank of India and the profitability 
of the central government public enterprises whose accounts 
are published by the^Bureau of Public Enterprises. The study 
was limited to the three years from 1983-84 to 1985-86. It 
was found that the privately owned firms realized a larger 
return on capital (measured as a ratio of profit before tax 
plus interest to total capital employed) than public enterprises, 
but that the difference shrank considerably after the sick uits 
were excluded. Public enterprises in petroleum and related 
sectors were far more profitable than others, but even when 
those particular enterprises were taken out and but taken-over 
/in rates of return 
sick enterprises were excluded, the—difference/between public and private enterprises was not all that large (being generally 
of the order of 1 - 2%). 
When damming comparisons between the nominal profita-
bility of private and public enterprises are made, it has also 
to be kept in mind that the Reserve Bank of India's sample of 
large private firms does not include the sick units, large or 
small. The magnitude of sickness, even among the larger private 
firms can be seen from the fact that at the end of June 1985, 
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the total outstanding debt of 597 private firms, each with 
a bank credit limit of Rs.lO million or more came to Rs.26, 553.9 
(33) 
million z for getting an idea of the magnitude of the 
problem it should be noted that the total capital employed 
by the private firms studied by Sankar, Tilak and Sai in 
1984-85 was Rs. 202,990 million, so that the outstanding debt 
of this group of sick units accounted for considerably more 
than 10 per cent of the total capital employed. The problem 
has become m^re, rather than less, acute since then. 
We have pointed to some of the reasons for the excess 
costs incurred and the loss of profitability suffered by 
public sector units. Overmanning and above-average earnings 
of workers have been cited as two of the major factors behind 
losses suffered by public enterprises not only in India but 
(34) 
also in other countries of South Asia. The constraints 
on the freedom of managers to hire and fire workers are also 
seen as reasons for the malfunctioning of public enterprises. 
First of all, it should be pointed out that the growth in 
real earnings ot public enterprise employees and of the 
workers in the organized sector in general have often been 
exaggerated. As the recent report of the Economic Advisory 
Council of the government of India (Chairman i Sukamoy (35) 
Chakravarty) has pointed out, ' over the period from 1970-71 
to 1985-86 the real wages of the employees of public enterprises 
increased at around 2.4 per cent per annum as against a growth 
of 1.6 per cent per year in Indian real income per head over 
the same period. Bagaram Tulpule and R.C. Dutta estimated in 
a recent paper that taking three-year moving averages over 
the period from 1960 to 1983, real wages per head of workers 
in the organised manufacturing sector had increased by 37.5 
per cent while per capita real income had increased during 
no 
the same period by 30.8 per cent.(36) There is no reason to 
believe that wages of workers in public sector manufacturing 
industry increased any faster. In assessing the significance 
of these figures, we have to remember that they are not 
normalized for changes in skill composition : over the years, 
the proportion of skilled personnel to unskilled workers has 
risen in virtually all sectors, and the weight of skill-
intensive industries in the industrial structure has also 
increased. Secondly, there are enormous variations in the 
average earnings of different public enterprises, with workers 
in mines and crude engineering generally earning much less 
than workers in financial and purely trading companies. Of 
course, not all skill-and capital-intensive technologies are 
optimal and permanent workers in the organized sector do get 
a better deal than workers in the unorganized sector. But 
the above-average earnings of skilled workers in most firms 
are not the cause of the lower profitability of public 
enterprises. 
Overmanning in public enterprises must be also seen 
in its proper context. Some overmanning is certainly caused 
by the natural desire of workers threatened by unemployment 
to protect their jobs. But quite a part of it is connected 
with the s ame managerial and planning failures that have led 
to the overestimation of initial capacity, delays in construc-
tion, holding of excess inventories and unplanned shutdowns 
and breakdowns. Some is directly attributable to the inabilil 
or unwillingness of the ruling class seriously to alter the 
pre-capitalist, inegalitarian and highly exploitative social 
setting in which the enterprises are situated. One of the bef 
examples of the harmful effects of such a policy is the workii 
of mines in the coal belt of Bihar. At the time of nationali-
zation of the private coal mines, many of the contractors and 
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political bosses managed to put their own men as regular 
employees in the mines. But this overmanning could have 
been absorbed as the coal output expanded, and it has been 
argued that if mining was properly carried out, the existing 
labour-force would be fully needed for raising the coal. 
What has happened, however, is that the whole coal belt has 
become infested by a group of private operators who systemati-
cally steal good-quality coal from the mines, in the name of 
buying 'shaley' coal, and the nationalized coal companies lose 
hundreds of millions of rupees in the process. However, the 
manufacturing or metallurgical or electricity generating 
industries - many of them under public .ownership - get rocks, 
shale and coal with very high ash contents in the name of 
coking coal, and naturally they also incur enormous losses 
through damage of boilers, turbines, and through breakdowns. 
This operation is conducted, of course, only with the connivance 
and active collaboration of corrupt company officials and under 
the protection of political bosses, who are themselves often 
leaders of the mafia. The government has tried to meet the 
situation in several ways • by raising the price of coal, by 
resorting to increased degrees of mechanization, introducing 
open-cast mining and as a last desperate measure, importing 
foreign coal for the metallurgical industries and thermal 
power stations. The first measure feeds the forces of 
inflation. The second two measures have helped in raising 
output growth; however, lack of proper maintenance of the 
machinery has meant that the capital cost of the operation has 
gone up enormously and eroded the anticipated profits mf the 
units. Moreover, open cast mining in the middle of villages 
populated by socially and politically weak ethnic groups 
(mostly belonging originally to autochthonous tribes) and with 
little control over irresponsible mine officials and local 
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authorities is leading to environmental degradation at an 
alarming rate. The import of foreign (mostly Australian) 
coal at prices higher than those paid for Indian coal of the 
same quality is straining India's balance of payments further 
while depriving the coal companies of badly needed revenues. 
In the areas of mining and exploitation of forest 
produce, the conflict between the modus operandi of public 
enterprises or public authorities in charge of forests and 
the ordinary people (a large proportion of whom belong to the 
socalled tribal groups) becomes most evident. In the operation 
of steel plants the use of contract workers who are paid by 
the contractors of the concerned public enterprise and have 
little security of employment is widely prevalent. In a 
number of cases, the attempt by contract labourers to organize 
trade unions and go on strike in fulfilment of a demand for 
higher wages and better working conditions has been resisted 
vi.olently by the contractors with the help of the police and 
the local public enterprise authorities. 
" ..] " - • 
\ :."« : 4 • {*.. i. . .f . r 
1. On 2 June 1977, for example, the police fired on the 
striking workers of the Dhalli Rajahara mines in the Durg 
I" t V 
district of Madhya Pradesh killing 10 persons,including a woman 
(3 8) 
and 2 children. These were the captive mines of the Bhilai 
Steel Plant. Almost a year later, on 5 April 1978, at Kirandul, 
;in the district of Bastar, the police were sent to arrest the 
leaders of striking workers of the Bailadilla iron ore mines 
(located in the Bastar district of Madhya Pradesh) and facing 
resistance, they fired upon the workers, killing between 11 
(official figure) and two dozen workers (unofficial estimate) (39) 
and set fire to the huts of some two hundred families. 
These mines were owned by the National Mineral Development 
Corporation, and the ore was exported to Japan z the striking 
J* 
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workers again were contract labour many of whom had been 
retrenched because of a fall in demand for the ore from 
Japan. 
Similar examples could be given of how ishe police, 
'acting on behalf of vested interests brutally repressed workers in 
forests taken over by the state. Such struggles and repression 
illustrate vividly the difficulties of using public enterprises 
as means of transforming the nature of the economy and society 
in a country in which many citizens are still to be accorded 
full civil rights, even though such rights are guaranteed to 
them by the constitution. They also bring out again the 
inadequacy of purely managerial solutions to the problem of ren-
dering public enterprises publicly accountable and making than 
contribute to the development of national economy in proportion 
to the resources they command. 
Even were we to sweep the problem of a radical 
transformation of the Indian society under the carpet, the 
present ad hoc strategy for using public enterprises as 
instruments of economic development and the suggested alter-
native of treating them as simply profit maximizing firms 
under public ownership would both be condemned if we look at 
the macroeconomic setting of these enterprises. 
The Chakravarty Report of 1987 we have already referred 
to did not examine the role of public enterprises in the social 
transformation of the country but did suggest that public 
enterprises could be made more profitable and more productive 
if a macroeconomic strategy of growth was followed in which 
the fuller exploitation of capacities of public enterprises 
in all sectors of the economy played an important role. The 
report envisaged the linking up of public sector enterprises 
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-Whrough a process of mutual demand generation and supply-
support. Such a strategy would be a necessary part of a 
programme of better integration of public enterprises in 
the national economy. To be sustainable over time, such a 
programme has to be embedded, in a more general policy regime 
aiming at dynamic self-reliance, a regime that has been 
conspicuously absent, especially since the 1970s. 
As a first requirement of such a strategy, the 
private expenditure flows, income generation processes and 
asset holdings have to match the redirection of economic 
activities implicit in the Chakravarty recommendations. The 
government has to subsidise the private sector less and tax 
it more; it has also to exercise the credit regulation powers 
it theoretically possesses, instead of mostly adapting them 
to private sector demands. Secondly, at the stage of project 
choice and construction,effective absorption of technology 
has to be ensured through the elimination of control by 
foreign firms, through back-up R & D efforts, and through the 
support of a continuous process of technological adaptation 
and upgradation in all industries. The recent report of the 
CSIR Review Committee has rightly stressed the need to scale 
up and commercialize technologies produced by the CSIR 
laboratories. ^ ' However, the report does not make a binding 
recommendation that all public and private sector firms 
importing technologies must put in an effective programme of 
R & D » in collaboration with CSIR laboratories or 
such consultancy organisations as the PDIL, PEDO or the MECON. 
The immediate prospect is the further decimation of civilian 
R & D effort and acceleration of the process of import of 
imperfectly absorbed, obsolete and inappropriate technologies. 
The costs imposed by such a policy regime on public sector ' 
firms and on the economy in general will further damage the ability 
of public enterprices to be an important ingredient for 
accelerating industrial growth in the long run. As we have 
noted already, the Chakravarty Report (1987) does not also 
address the question of social transformation of states such 
as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, whose societies 
and politics are dominated by landlords„ Without that kind 
of transformation, "rational" labour processes of the early 
American, late American or Japanese variety cannot be firmly 
implanted in either public or private sector firms. Even if 
the managerial regime of a firm is initially patterned along 
any of those lines, its actual working will either be subverted 
by osmosis of the 'irrational' relations of the surrounding 
society or will be protected only by invoking the repressive 
features of the state apparatus. In practice, repression and 
osmosis of surrounding social relations exist side by side, 
provoking violent conflicts • from time to time. 
7. Evolution of the industrial structure, increasing 
centralization of political power and capital, 
increasing import dependence and a further tilt 
towards internationalized domestic capital. 
! | , " 
i 
During the period since 1951, Indian industry, including 
public sector industry-, has grown in size and diversity. Over 
the years the weights.of capital goods industries and of 
consumer durables in the composition of aggregate industrial 
output have increased at the expense of the simpler types of ( /1 1 \ 
consumer goods. International factors, deep-seated forces 
of changes in the expenditures of different income groups and 
deliberate central government policies have all played a part 
in this structural evolution. 
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International factors have had their impact through 
numerous channels, of which the most important are the following. 
First, technical changes occurring mainly in the OECD countries 
have altered the composition of final goods. The emergence of 
synthetic textiles and of electronic goods are perhaps the 
most striking of these changes during the last thirty years. 
Secondly, technological change has also affected the nature of 
imports entering into industrial production and the intensity 
of their use. The use of oil and natural gas as a base for a 
large variety of products, of plastics as raw materials for 
many products where metals or natural fibres had been used 
before, the spread of microelectronics into every department 
of production of capital goods, the increasing diffusion of 
fuel-efficient engines - these are some of the forces shaping 
the linkages within the industrial sector ; new linkages lead 
to the destruction of old linkages in a continually evolving 
pattern. Thirdly, the technologies for most of the new products 
and processes have come to be controlled by a small group of 
TNCs based in the OECD block. This has meant that unless the 
government ic able to pursue a consistent policy of excluding 
the. TNCs from controlling the implantation of new factories or 
having a say in their management, the pattern of import of 
technology is very largely shaped by the strategic choices 
of the TNCs rather than the host government. Neither the public 
nor the private sector is immune to this kind of external 
influence. We have provided illustrations of how 
central government defaults have led to the hobbling of the 
bargaining power of public sector enterprises in a number of 
industries which have been at the forefront of structural 
change in India. 
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Fourthly, in recent years, the entanglement of most 
Latin American countries in a debt trap has made India a more 
attractive proposition for penetration of foreign loan capital 
and, to a lesser extent, of foreign equity capital. The policy 
of wooing foreign capital that the Indian government has pursued 
since the late 1970s has at last began to bear fruit in 
inducting more foreign capital as a motor for Indian industria-
lization. Such penetration has inevitably tilted the effective 
balance in favour of large-scale private industry, but it has 
also made Indian industrialization much more vulnerable to 
changes in the external payments scenario than before. 
Over the last thirty years, a class of people have 
grown up in India who can command, with their incomes, most 
of the new consumer durables that the middle income- groups 
(say, from the third upto the seventh decile) can afford in 
OECD countries. This class may not exceed 10 percent of the 
population, but 10 per cent of a country of 800 million forms 
a sizeable market. Growing incomes have been concentrated 
among upper income groups, and in particular regions. Agricul-
tural incomes of some states such as Punjab and Haryana have 
grown much faster than the all-India average, whereas large 
i , 
parts of central, southern and eastern India have fallen below 
the all-India average. Industrial incomes in such states as 
Gujarat and Maharashtra and the region in and around Delhi 
have tended to grow faster than the rest of India. Again, 
while employment in the organized formal enterprises (including 
those in manufacturing, transport, banking etc.) has tended to 
grow slowly, incomes generated in both the secondary and tertiary 
sectors have grown far faster.Since real wages in those sectors 
have not expanded as fast, there is reason to believe that these 
incomes, especially incomes in the tertiar sector have tended to (42 ) be more unevenly distributed over time. Deliberate policies 
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pursued by the central government such as a steady raising of 
"s^ l^ ing that entitle income-earners to tax benefits and the 
effective freeing of a large fraction of dividend incomes and 
incomes from other types of corporate instruments from 
tax payments have helped further concentration of disposable 
incomes among richer people. On the other side, deliberate 
v 
encouragement of the production of consumer durables such as 
cars, motorized two-wheelers, TV sets, etc. through the 
selective freeing of control over investment in these sectors, 
the selective raising of import quotas for the components of 
these durables and selective lowering of tariff rates on many 
of the imported components, and encouragement of investment in 
socalled high technology areas have helped 
promote the growth of such industries and the industries linked 
to them on the supply or on the demand side. Such policies 
have encouraged the growth of particular public sector units 
such as Maruti Udyog which produces cars, almost exclusively 
for the domestic market with Japanese technology and with a 
very large component (often effectively exceeding 60 per cent 
of the cost of production) of imports from Japan. But since 
the private sector is far more specialized in the newer types 
of consumer goods, on the whole, the combination of income 
concentration and 1 liberalizing' government policy has tilted 
the-balance in favour of the private sector. 
It should be noted in this connection that although 
India has a guasi-federal constitution, the trend of the 
dominant political party policy since independence has been 
towards further and further concentration of power in the hands 
(43) 
of the central government. Successive constitutional 
amendments and the record of central intervention to topple 
democratically elected state governments have increased the 
effective power of a central government which was already made 
- s 4 9 
the decisive authority in the constitution of 1950. One 
justification for providing overriding financial powers to 
the federal g^,v^rnment was thought to be that only such powers 
would enable/to set up capital-dominated enterprises in the 
public sector and to help the private sector with credits(both 
in local currency and foreign exchange)to set up such units. 
The minimum size of process plants capable of breaking even 
has been increasing in many sectors. This fact has provided 
further justification for the tendency towards centralization 
of financial and regulatory powers. However, in this whole 
process, the question of diffusion of both purchasing power 
and technical change tended to get a short sbrift. 
On paper, public sector units were told to subcontract 
out as much of their input requirements to ancillary units as 
'possible, but the proportion of inputs procured in this way 
has remained very low (less than 10 per cent) for most units. 
Any synergy that might have accrued through increased 
productivity and purchasing power generated by such linkages 
with small producing units was largely lost. Moreover, many 
of the presumed economies of scale failed to materialize because 
of delays, inappropriate choices of technology and overmanning. 
The centralizing prowess of the public sector has been 
used in recent years to strengthen organized private industry, 
and in some cases, to help the process of extreme centralization 
of private economic power. Over the years, in course of the 
business activities of public term-lending institutions and 
other investing agencies such as the Life Insurance Corporation, 
the General Insurance Corporation and the Unit Trust of India, 
the public sector has become the chief shareholder and creditor 
of many, if not most, term-lending institutions. In some cases, 
(45) they have become even the majority shareholders. Yet the 
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public sector financial agencies have refused to exercise any 
real control over these enterprises, and seem to have intervened 
only to carry out the partisan objectives of powerful politicians 
in the central government. In a recent notorious case, the 
Reliance Industries which had grown explosively through a 
combination of dynamic enterpreneurship and clever manipulation 
of the regulatory functions of the government was allowed to 
acquire the control of a major engineering and construction 
group, viz., Larsen and Toubro,through the active co-operation 
of public sector banks and term-lending institutions.^^ It 
has been widely suggested by many analysts including an ex-
Finance Minister and ex-Defence Minister of the central 
government that the nexus between the Reliance group and the 
party in power in New Delhi extends far beyond stock-jobbing 
(47) and corporate raids. 
The rise of Reliance is, however, significant in 
another respect. The group has been able to raise far more-
capital through shares and convertible debentures than 
•r • 
practically all other firms or conglomerates in Indian history. 
But the achievement of the group is not unique in this respect. 
It is an aspect of the deliberate fostering of an equity 
capital market through all kinds of special favours granted 
to i n v e s t o r s . B u t there is as yet very little control 
over insider trading and other practices which have been 
subjects of a considerable amount of regulatory activity in 
capital markets of advanced capitalist countries. 
The hectric promotion of a private capital market is 
yet another aspect of the strategy of income concentration and 
nurturing of private business followed by the central government 
(and the state governments in their competitive race to attract 
private investment have also doled out considerable volumes of 
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largesse to private capital). It has been recently claimed 
that there was a significant acceleration in the rate of 
(49) 
industrial growth in India in the 1980s. Despite some 
reservations about the comparability of data between the 
1980s and the 1950s and 1960s[50^it is undeniable that there 
has been an upswing in the rate of industrial growth in the 
1980s, compared with the stagnation between the mid-1960s 
and the mid-l970s. But this upswing is connected not only 
with the general concentration of incomes and financial power 
and the strategies fostering such concentration pursued by 
the central government noted above but also with a steep 
increase in the dependence on imports and foreign loans 
compared with the 1960s and 1970s. Imports have been delibe-
rately encoufaged by the Indian government in trhe name of 
liberalization. Since exports have not expanded in step, and 
since concessional aid has contracted as a proportion of the 
accumulated balance of payments deficits, both the value of 
interest-bearing external debt and debt service charges have 
expanded over time. "3 * ' .,.. • - -
There have been attempts in official circles to 
underplay the growth of India's external debt. The 
foreign currency deposits of the non-resident Indian (NIR) 
which can be withdrawn at short notice a r e' f o r 
example, excluded, in the calculation of external debt by the 
(51) 
Reserve Bank of India. However, the latter did provide a 
separate table of NRI deposits. Taking the official figures 
of external assistance and commercial borrowing together, we 
find that the external debt increased from Rs.39,619 crore at 
. end-March 1985 to Rs.83,835 crore at end-March 1989. The 
real burden of the debt has increased faster because the rates 
of interest and the average maturity of the debt have gone up. 
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Moreover, non-official estimates and estimates by the 
Washington-based Institute of International Finance have put 
the figure even higher, ranging up to Rs. 100,000 crore or US 
$ 60 billion in the beginning of 1989 s.the difference between 
the official and the non-official estimates is due to the 
fact the latter include short-term trade credits and defence 
(52) 
related loans from East European countries. The debt-
servicing charges have also gone up considerably over time. 
It may be argued that neither the increase in external 
debt nor the rise in the debt-servicing charges need be 
alarming, if thereby the economy acquires the capacity to 
generate a much larger value of exports and bring down the 
balance of payments deficit. As yet, there is no sign of 
such a development. Imports have increased considerably 
faster than exports in the 1980s; and the current account 
deficit has accordingly widened from 1.2 per cent of GDP in 
1980-81 to 1.9 per cent in 1987-88 and 2.8 per cent in l988-8^3' 
The increased dependence on foreign credits has tended 
to change the ideological balance and the balance of political 
forces in favour of the private sector and foreign firms 
hoping to dominate the Indian market. Such organisations as 
the IMF and the World Bank, and TNCs,including transnational 
banks,have long preached the virtue of economic liberalization 
and privatization and in general favoured the private customers. 
They have also pushed for abolition of such measures as a 
separate patents law, or treatment of trade in services on a 
different footing from commodity trade. The Indian government's 
stand in recent years on these issues has been considerably 
weakened by the pressures exerted by the TNCs, the US 
4. * (54) government etc. 
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Ironically enough, government policies of liberali-
zation, with a consequentially increased dependence on foreign 
firms, were supposed to encourage the induction of high 
technology which would in its turn lead to the replacement of 
imports and growth of exports at a faster rate than before. 
Similar arguments were also used to accord virtually indiscri-
minate - though often bureaucratically delayed - permission 
to both public and private enterprises to enter into collabo-
ration agreements with foreign firms„ Such agreements have 
been made mostly for limited licence rather than outright 
purchase, of knowhow, and very rarely, for purchase or licence 
of foreign patents except when they have become economically 
obsolete. 
However, studies by the Reserve Bank of India have 
demonstrated that the net foreign exchange spent by the aggre-
gate sample of firms entering into foreign collaboration have 
been massively negative, that this negative balance has tended 
to grow over time, and that their exports have not grown any 
455) 
faster than before. (There is also some suspicion of a 
growing wastage of factors of production since the proportion 
of valub-added to gross output declined over time). A study 
by Chalapati Rao has also come out with the finding that while 
total Indian exports expanded by more than 100 per cent between 
1975-76 and 1983-84, the export earnings of the top 405 private 
sector companies expanded only by 49 per cent but the foreign 
exchange expenditures of those same companies expanded by more 
than 2 50 per cent s in fact, from being net earners of foreign 
exchange, they turned into massive spenders of foreign exchange (56) 
during these years. Chalpati Rao's study also confirms a 
hunch that the Indian small scale sector generates most-of the 
increase in export e a r n i n g s a n d that large, socalled 
technology-intensive (meaning import-intensive) firms are 
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responsible for much of the increase in imports on corporate 
account. Within the group of large-scale firms, except for 
the petroleum enterprises in the public sector, it is mainly 
the private sector units which are still the major spenders 
of foreign exchange. However, since there are firms such as 
Maruti Udyog nominally in the public sector, the net foreign 
exchange balance of the latter has also tended to worsen over 
the years. 
The tendency towards induction of imports of foreign 
knowhow, goods and control, with the active collaboration of 
private firms and many influential civil servants and 
politicians, has been aggravated in recent times. This has 
had a severe impact on the degree,of utilization of capacity 
of major public sector uanits, and on the ability to gain from 
learning and increase the productivity of agents of production. 
Two recent examples will illustrate this. The BHEL, for example, 
had emerged as the principal builder of electrical power 
equipment in India, and had been responsible for erecting the 
major part of the capacity for electricity generation in the 
country until very recently. But as the Indian government 
decided to import project equipment,on preferential terms, a 
large amount of imported equipment has been installed in India 
already. And as the Indian debt situation has worsened, while 
massive excess capacity exists in the global electrical 
equipment industry, there has been increasing pressure for 
import of thermal, hydroelectric and gas-based power equipment 
under bilateral aid. The Chakravarty Report of 1987 had already 
pointed to the threat to the BHEL's capacity utilization posed 
by these developments. Most recent reports indicate that this 
threat is likely to be realized during the Eighth Plan period, 
when a major public enterprise with a good track record will 
( 57) be rendered sick. 
5 5 : -
Because of endemic balance of payments problems, 
shifts in the balance of political power favouring the private 
(58) 
sector and capitalists concentrated in particular regions, 
and because of an unthinking enthusiasm for socalled high 
technology, there have been delays in the modernisation of 
many public sector enterprises. One of the units for which 
a decision to modernize was made is the Durgapur Steel Plant. 
This contract has reportedly been granted to a consortium of 
foreign firms, and the main agents for inducting them are 
reported to be two Indian private consultancy organizations 
with little expertise but with considerable political backing 
(one of them is a Birla f i r m ) . T h i s will mean a further 
set-back for Indian public sector (or private) consultancy 
organizations with some real expertise, and a big blow to the 
publicly-owned Heavy Engineering Corporation, which is likely 
to receive few orders from the foreign consortium. 
One of the most ironical aspects of the industrial 
growth scenario as projected by central government spokesmen 
in recent times is that the pace-setters for growth have been 
two sectors under public control, viz., mining (and quarrying), 
and electricity. These two have a combined weight of 22.89 
in the new index of industrial production (with 1980-81 as 
base). Over the years from 1980-81 to 1987-88, while the indices 
for mining and electricity rose from 100 to 184.3 and from 
100 to 181.0 respectively, the index for manufacturing rose 
from 100 to 162.0 only. The acceleration of the rate of 
industrial growth looks less impressive when the two major 
public sector industries are taken out. Moreover, many of 
the manufacturing industries which have experienced strong 
rates of growth,such as, for example, the electronics industry 
have a high import content ; if import duties are included in 
the cost of imports (as they should be for comparability, 
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since the values of final products are estimated at domestic 
prices), the share of imports to the production of electronic 
import share must be much higher, since import substitution 
has been virtually completd in older types of goods such as 
radio sets, black and white TV sets etc. 
the first two plan periods, mostly in a complementary if 
mostly asymmetrical, relationship. To the private sector in 
India, the growth of the public sector provided markets, 
capital and intermediate goods at low prices, and opportunities 
for making windfall gains as middlemen, mostly of foreign firms. 
It was earlier a means of channelling public resources for 
private gain by other devices such as outright subsidies and 
. ..cheap credit. The public sector may have benefited occasionally 
through the infusion of managerial talent from the private 
sector. But in some phases of its development, large business 
groups have viewed the public sector as a predatory accumulator 
of resources. Later on, as the private sector fattened on 
these gains, and the central government failed to gear up its 
fiscal machinery to garner any significant fraction of the 
increased incomes of the rich, it appeared to big business 
interests that the government stood in their way in denying 
them an unfettered freedom for expansion. From time to time, 
the private sector complained of the crowding out of its 
investment. It is not surprising that some studies have found 
evidence of competitiveness between the public and private 
sectors in recent years for scarce finance, or foreign exchan 
However, as it has been rightly argued, from the point of view 
of the performance of the economy as a whole, it is the 
differential impact on total investment and on growth that 
should be considered the decisive criterion for choosing between 
goods works out at 2 4 per cent in 1986. (60) The marginal 
The public and private sectors in India were, during 
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( 6 2 ) public and private sector investment. From that point of 
view, public sector investment is still found to be superior 
because of its linkage effects and its distributional impact. 
One key area in which the public sector could play a 
critical role is that of R & D and learning by doing in the 
capital goods industries and consultancy enterprises. In 
both these fields in India, it is the public sector which has 
set the pace, and there is no sign that the private sector can 
displace it in the near future. Some factors which we have 
already mentioned already, eroded the effectiveness of public 
sector industry as the builder of linkages, generator of 
investment and promoter of technical change and productivity 
growth. First and foremost, the refusal of the ruling classes 
to carry out peasant-oriented land reforms and to adopt any 
other measures for redistribution of assets towards the lower 
income groups continued to depress the purchasing power of the 
population, and their ability to work with productivity-raising 
technologies. The illiteracy of the majority of the Indian 
people aggravated these problems. Secondly, the fattening 
of the large-scale private sector at the expense of the poor 
and the public sector increased the ability of the former to 
sabotage the public objectives pursued by the public sector. 
Thirdly, the excessively centralizing policies of the federal 
government and the associated reliance on socalled high 
technology increased its tendency to rely on foreign firms as 
the ability of the public sector to adapt imported technologies, 
absorb them effectively or generate (or use, where they were 
available) technologies appropriate to the environment was 
impaired by the default of the ruling classes and the policies 
of income concentration pursued by the government. 
58 2-
However, in spite of all these problems, it is unlikely 
that public sector industry will be phased out soon. Even the 
large-scale private sector needs the public sector industry 
as a prey (as a source of subsidized inputs, as a field for 
making quick money out of contracts, and even as a collaborator 
in financial deals) . Any sustainable predator-prey relationship/ 
as any student of ecology knows/ has to go through cycles ; if 
the prey disappears, the predator may also face extinction. 
Moreover, 'the private sector cannot replace the public sector 
in most areas of infrastructural investment. Again, small 
businessmen and industrialists depend a lot on various kinds 
of support given by the public sector. Hence even if the 
cries of the poor are not heard in the corridors of power in 
New Delhi, there are other forces which will prevent a rapid 
privatization of the public sector in India. 
8. Epilogue 
The strengthening of domestic industry by public 
sector operations has been, increasingly subverted by the 
internationalization of domestic capital, and the continued 
obstruction of capitalist growth by the prevalence of landlordism, 
and speculative motivations of domestic capital, often in 
association with the state apparatus. Apart from massive 
flights of domestic capital, the encouragement provided by a 
government increasingly dependent on foreign credits to the 
activities of non-resident Indians, and the agents of foreign 
firms ,has posed new threats to the prospects of building up 
an integrated and technically dynamic industrial sector in 
India. But the Brazilian predicament in which India is likely 
to find herself may be part of the plan of some very powerful 
elements in the private sector and the central government. 
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Building on the experience of the Soviet Union, Indian 
planners envisaged the growth of a basically resource-constrained, 
administered economy. A series of measures to stimulate 
scientific and technological research mighthave reinforced 
the investment-powered growth to let loose a process of 
cumulative causation similar to the one for which Nicholas 
Kaldor had theorized in several papers. But markets interfered 
to punctuate resource-constraints with demand-constraints; 
private profit motives and policy-reinforced dependence on 
external resources repeatedly messed up cumulative causation. 
Semi-feudal relations blocked the working of free markets in 
land, labour, credit and commodities ,and arbitrageurs and 
speculators prevented the predictability of the 'administered' 
man. There are no perfect markets out there somewhere to 
provide magical escape routes out of this messy, ever-
interrupted process of cumulative causation. What has been 
offered as a market solution is mainly putting the public 
exchequer at the service of internationalized domestic capital. 
Public sector industry has become another milch cow in that 
farm. But, in a non-socialist, underdeveloped economy, a 
relationship of alternate conflict and complementarity between 
the public and private sectors is only to be expected s ending 
these phase-differentiated or even simultaneously operating 
processes would need radical political solutions. 
/^Clarification s The paper was completed before the Lok 
Sabha elections of November 1989.7 
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